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New Directions in Debt Management
by Stephany Griffith-Jones*
and Lucy Nichols**
"The debt bomb of the newspaper headlines has turned out to be more
like a debt cancer-less explosive, but every bit as traumatic and even-
tually destructive. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread debt crises since 1982 have produced divergent views
on the nature of debtors' financing problems and their solutions.
Creditors have concentrated on the need to continue debt-service pay-
ments and have supported a multilateral negotiating framework. Debt-
ors have been preoccupied with restoring growth and development in the
face of increasing protectionism, low commodity prices and, most impor-
tantly, the dramatic erosion in the availability of external finance.
Between 1982 and 1985, Latin America has paid the United States
$100 billion more in debt service and profit remittances than it has re-
ceived in net capital inflows. Financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa re-
main positive, but have fallen from a peak of about $2.8 billion in 1980 to
$0.8 billion in 1985.2
And since 1984, the developing countries as a whole have also been
net exporters of capital. The United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) estimates the net outflow from developing
* Stephanie Griffith-Jones, Ph.D. Cambridge University, is a Fellow at the Institute of Devel-
opment Studies at the University of Sussex where she is co-ordinating an international project on the
impact of the debt crisis on various Latin American countries. Previously, Ms. Griffith-Jones was
associated with the Central Bank of Chile and Barkleys Bank International, United Kingdom. She
has also acted as a consultant to various international organizations including the World Bank, EC
Commission, Commonwealth Secretariat, UNCTAD and UNICEF. Ms. Griffith-Jones has pub-
lished a large number of articles and four books on macro economic issues and on external financial
flows to Latin American countries. Her most recent book, co-authored with 0. Sunkel, THE CRISIS
OF DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA is published by Oxford University Press.
** Lucy Nichols, B.A. Colby College, M.A. University of Sussex, currently a Ph.D. candidate
at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex and a researcher at the Overseas
Development Institute, London.
1 S. Ramphal, Challenge and Opportunity for the World Bank, introductory remarks on the
occasion of an address by Tom Clausen, President of the World Bank (London, Mar. 14, 1986).
2 See Avramovic, Transfer of Resources to Developing Countries, Report to the Group of
Twenty-Four (Jan. 20, 1986).
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countries totalled $16 billion in 1985' and more recent studies put the
total at about $25 billion for 1985.'
Furthermore, in the Latin American case, the net transfer of re-
sources has had a profound and long-term impact on the region's devel-
opment. For the whole 1973-1985 period, Latin America contributed an
estimated $15 billion to the international financial system.
Net Transfers to and from Latin America, (US billions)*
1973-81 + 91.8
1982-85 -106.3
1973-85 - 14.5
Source: U.S. Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), BALANCE PRELIMINAR DE
LA ECONOMIA LATINOAMERICANA, 1985. *Net financial transfers are defined as net capital
inflows minus net payments of profits and interest. A positive sign implies a net inflow of resources.
Even though Latin America's debt grew spectacularly by at least
$200 billion from 1973 to 1985, the continent did not benefit for the pe-
riod as a whole from the positive inflow, but actually made a net negative
transfer. As can be seen above, Latin America received a positive net
transfer of about $10 billion per year from 1973-81, equivalent to 16% of
the region's exports.' From 1982-1985, net capital inflows fell as interest
payments skyrocketed. This prompted a net outflow of about $25 billion
per year, or about 25% of exports.6
The dramatic decline in the availability of external resources, in-
creasing protection of export markets and low commodity prices, have
caused growth, consumption and investment to fall. This has resulted in
some debtor governments rethinking their debt-management strategies.
In 1985, Latin America's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was
about 10% below its 1980 level, reversing 30 years of uninterrupted
growth. In Africa, average GDP per capita fell 16% in the last six years
from already low levels.7
Most debtor governments have accepted the need for often draco-
nian economic adjustment to stay within the financing contraints im-
posed by the unfavorable world economic environment and the need to
finance their debts despite these costs. But since 1985, a few debtor gov-
ernments, especially in Latin America, have begun to perceive that mas-
sive and pervasive net transfers have strengthened their bargaining
3 UNCTAD, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1985)
4 See Avramovic, supra note 2.
5 U.N. CEPAL, Economic Comm. for Latin America and the Carribean, Balance Preliminar
de la Economia Latinoamericana (1985).
6 Id.
7 UNICEF, RECESSION, ADJUSTMENT AND HUMAN WELFARE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
1980s: AN OVERVIEW 23 (1986).
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position and have re-defined the minimum debt-resceduling deals accept-
able to them.' That is, governments have shifted toward the view that it
is the international financial system that has to adjust to their pressing
growth and development needs, and that if it does not do so sufficiently,
debtor nations will be forced to take unilateral action and lighten the
burden of negative net transfers.
Debtor governments taking this new approach have some sympathy
and support from those concerned with the plight of the poor in develop-
ing countries, those who believe that stagnation of slow growth in the
developing economies contributes to lower world economic growth and
those who benefit directly from growth such as industrial-country ex-
porters and investors.9
A new strategy to deal with the crises of debt and development in
the 1980s needs to significantly increase the flow of external resources to
developing countries. Also, debt negotiations must widen their scope be-
yond multi-year rescheduling and reductions of fees and spreads. This is
because such measures lead only to marginal changes in the availability
of resources.
Although these criteria require fairly radical changes in debt-crises
management and international financial intermediation, this is by no
means radical in itself. Practically all schools of economic thought as-
sume that the normal direction of flows of financial resources should be
from relatively richer, capital-abundant industrial economies to the rela-
tively poorer, capital-scarce developing economies, and certainly not in
the opposite direction. °
A drastic reduction or cessation of negative net transfers is a condi-
tion for restoring growth in developing countries to pre-crises levels and
would hopefully be a first step towards restoring positive transfers of re-
sources. The Commonwealth Secretariat's report on the debt crisis em-
phasized this point as follows:
It is a matter or urgency to put an end to the premature outflows of
resources from developing countries. 1
This paper will first review debt crises management to date, arguing
that most developing countries are no nearer to a long-term solution to
their financing problems and that current strategy will not work as long
as external trends continue to contravene its underlying assumptions.
Second, a discussion of how the management strategy has changed since
8 Authors inference from many sources.
9 E.G. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE IMPACT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS
ON THE U.S. ECONOMY, 99th CONG., 2d SEss. (Comm. Print 1986).
10 The Debt Crisis and the World Economy in COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (1984). (Re-
port by the Commonwealth Group of Experts).
II Id.
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the Baker Initiative and the Mexican rescue package. And third, sugges-
tions on the essential ingredients of a debt management strategy that
could begin to solve the debt crises.
II. DEBT CRISES ORIGINS AND SIZE
The debt buildup had its roots in the emergence of transnational
banking and Euro-currency lending in the 1960s. It greatly accelerated as
commercial banks recycled surplus savings by lending to developing
countries whose external accounts began to deteriorate rapidly after the
rise in oil prices in 1973-74 and the slowdown in industrial countries'
growth.'" Industrial country governments approved of this recyclying by
commercial banks as it represented a "market" solution rather than a
''governmental" solution to the problem.
Private borrowing seemed in the interest of all the actors involved.
Debtors paid low nominal interest rates and often negative real interest
rates to finance a slower adjustment to an external shock.
Historical precedent suggested that capital transfers were essential
to development, and many governments were in the midst of major pub-
lic-sector investment programs that required imported capital goods. 3
The United States, after all, had enjoyed large capital inflows in the 19th
Century. Dell notes the United States often suspended interest payments
when a recession in Great Britain depressed the demand and prices of its
exports, or when high interest rates in Europe severely constricted capi-
tal flows. This pattern bears a resemblance to debtors' experience
today. "
For those who had access to it, bank lending looked like a good way
to finally get away from the conditionality of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Commercial bank loans were relatively quick to arrange
and had few strings attached. Official development assistance was stag-
nating and direct foreign investment was seen to create dependency.
Governments found commercial bank loans an ample and better substi-
tute for their traditional finance. Lending made sense as well. Recession
dampened the demand for commercial credit at home at a time when
deposits from oil producers and others were growing quickly. Further-
more, the loans to developing countries were profitable. Increasing com-
petition in the Euromarkets prompted commercial banks to diversify
their risk geographicaly and to begin lending to countries they had be-
come familiar with through their lending to multinational clients. High
12 S. GRIFFITH-JONES, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND LATIN AMERICA. (1982).
13 Well-know fact. Vast literature on import-substituting industrialisation.
14 Dell, The World Debt Problem: A Diagnosis in REPORT TO THE GROUP OF TWENTY-FOUR
(Jan. 1986) citing Solomon, The United States as Debtor in the 19th Century in BROOKINGS DISCUS-
SION PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 19 (May 1985).
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commodity prices in the 1970s, which bolstered the usual creditworthi-
ness measures and the prevalent idea amongst bankers that countries
could not go bankrupt, further, encouraged commercial lending.
Mexico's declaration of a temporary moratorium on debt service on
August 20, 1982 created crises headlines, but the underlying trends had
been deteriorating since the late 1970s. The increase in the price of oil
during 1978-79-and more importantly, the rise of monetarism with its
consequent increase in interest rates in the 1980s-and the recession in
the developed countries which reduced the demand for debtors' exports
contributed to debt-servicing problems. The commercial banks' cutback
of new lending after the Mexican moratorium tended to further under-
mine their clients' creditworthiness.
Internally, some debtors had added to the problem by using bor-
rowed money in ways that did not create debt-servicing capability, i.e.,
arms purchases, capital flight, or imports of consumption goods. From
1979-1983, capital flight was an important part of the increase in external
debt in Mexico and Argentina. 5 Other debtors, like South Korea, in-
vested the funds in industries that generated foreigned exchange to ser-
vice the loans.6
Much ink has been lavished in the debate over the external versus
the internal causes of the debt crises, a distinction that tends to be over-
drawn, but it is important to the moral arguments about debt relief. The
debtors' current account deficits were not prima facie evidence of fiscal
irresponsibility, but "to a large extent, a passive rather than an active
source of internal disequilibrium." 17 Capital flight, on the other hand,
clearly played a negative role. An IMF study of how 20 middle-income
countries used borrowed funds in the 1970s showed that, on the whole,
"increases in indebtedness.., have reflected primarily an exchange of
debt instruments for additional physical capital."' 8
The sheer number of developing countries that simultaneously ran
into debt-servicing difficulty argues strongly that common external
shocks played a primary role. The number of formal reschedulings
climbed from an average of four per year in the late 1970s to 13 in 1981,
31 in 1983 and 21 in 1984.19
Debtors reacted differently to the economic shocks-internal and
15 MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS
(March and April 1986); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, FUGA DE CAPITALES EN
AMERICA LATINA, 1970-1985." (Dep't of Econ. and Social Research, Working Paper).
16 Dell, supra note 14 (citing International Monetary Fund study).
17 INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK at 140-44 (1983) (cited by Dell
supra note 14).
18 Id.
19 INT'L MONETARY FUND, Recent Developments in External Debt Restructuring, 40 OCcA-
SIONAL PAPER (Oct. 1985).
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external-which emphasizes their heterogeneity, even though they share
common problems posed by the unfavorable external environment. The
size of the debt varies tremendously by region. The IMF estimates Af-
rica's debt totalled $128.5 billion in 1985, less than half the Western
Hemisphere's (Latin America) estimated $368 billion.2" Asia owed an
estimated $230 billion, Europe, $88 billion and the non-oil Middle East,
$74 billion.21 Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA's) debt is estimated at between
$81 billion and $125 billion at the end of 1985.22
In Latin America the main lenders were banks which have held
more than half of the external public debt since 1978. This is an unusu-
ally large proportion measured against an average of 16.4% in the 1960s
and 19.5% in the 1970s.23 Commercial bank rescheduling packages,
with IMF sanction, have been the primary "solution" to debt-servicing
problems thus far, as opposed to increased aid, new lending, or debt
relief.
African debtors in general, had far less access to financial markets
and show a greater diversity of lender and type of debt. Low income
SSA countries tend to owe the bulk of their debt to official creditors and
sometimes as arrears, (forms of debt that traditionally have not been eli-
gible for resceduling). As a result, African "solutions" have focused on
increasing concessional, bilateral and aid flows, except for a handful of
countries that borrowed from the banks.24
Latin American debt, held chiefly by the banks, is relatively more
sensitive to interest rate changes; African debt-servicing problems stem
more from falling commodity prices and declining terms of trade. Oil
exporters in both regions face similar debt-servicing problems.
III. DEBT MANAGEMENT TO DATE
The question-have the debt crises been managed toward a long-
term solution?-begs the fundamental issue of what constitutes progress,
a point debtors and creditors have not agreed on.
Is it meant that debtors have reduced their current account imbal-
ances to the point where they can finance them in the medium term given
external constraints and are therefore liquid? Or is it that the debtors'
economies have adapted structurally to the external environment? If so
20 INT'L MONETARY FUND. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, (Apr. 1986).
21 Id.
22 Brau, African Debt: Facts and Figures on the Current Situation, and Green, Comments, in
AFRICAN DEBT AND FINANCING, (Special Report No. 5, May 1986).
23 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA: 1986 ANNUAL REPORT, (WASH., DC 1987).
24 Chiefly, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria.
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how far do the indicators have to move before a debtor has adjusted
enough or "solved" the problem?
Or can a solution mean a lifting of the external financing constraint
and the restoration of growth and development of the debtors' econo-
mies? In this case, should not the international financial system have to
adjust to the debtors? If so, are falling real interest rates, rising commod-
ity prices, faster growth of world output and trade, or the revival of lend-
ing to be the key indicators of progress?
Despite the diversity of debtors, "management" through 1985 took
the first approach based on the argument, put forth by William Cline and
others, that the debtors were illiquid, not insolvent, and therefore war-
ranted new lending and rescheduling to tide them over until
creditworthiness and new financial flows were restored. 5
Dell, indentifies six assumptions underpinning the "management"
strategy: that OECD growth would be 3% or slightly less per year and
that the income elasticity of demand for imports from developing coun-
tries would revert to the favorable levels of the 1960s and 1970s, that
commodity markets would revive, that commercial bank exposure would
increase by 6% to 7% per year, that nominal and real interest rates
would fall, that developing countries would maintain access to creditors'
markets and finally, that "debtor countries would continue to accept
strong compression of consumption, investment and imports as well as
the postponement of any significant recovery of living standards to the
1990s or even (in the case of African countries) beyond."2 6
Forecasting the balancing of payments to estimate when countries
would be liquid again became in Carlos Diaz-Alejandro's words "major
indoor sport."'27 Cline's optimistic forecasts were broadly supported by
the IMF and World Bank scenarios from 1983 to 1985, reinforcing the
view that the crises were temporary and that short, sharp current ac-
count adjustments would restore debtors' creditworthiness and external
financial flows.28
These conjunctural forcasts, weakened by all the usual prediction
problems and the increasing volatility of the external environment,
proved a thin peg on which to hang an international debt strategy. Most
debtors have not begun to solve their financing problems as measured by
the "standard" creditworthiness measure, the debt-to-export ratio, and
25 W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMATIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE (1984).
26 Dell, supra note 14.
27 C. Diaz-Alejandro, Latin American Debt: I Don't Think We Are in Kansas Anymore, 2
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, (1984).
28 The World Bank and I.M.F. scenarios are printed annually in INT'L MONETARY FUND.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 1986 and WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1986.
That these reports reinforced the view that the debt crisis was temporary is our inference from
academic papers, meetings and the press.
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crises headlines that persist when debtors cannot find enough external
resources to finance their greatly reduced, current account deficits.
The IMF reports that developing countries decreased their current
account deficits from $91 billion in 1982 to $34 billion in 1985, largely
through a sharp contraction in imports.2 9 Latin America cut its current
account deficit from $41 billion in 1982 to $4 billion in 1985. The exter-
nal debt of the 10 major debtors continues to rise, albeit much more
slowly than before 1982. The debt incurred since 1982 has been used to
service old debts, creating no new productive capacity or debt-servicing
ability. As the Table below shows, most of their debt-to-export ratios
continue to worsen as export revenues decline on the back of low com-
modity prices. The ratios for Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and
Nigeria deteriorated greatly in 1986 as oil revenues fell. Scheduled inter-
est payment's share of export earnings has not fallen much since 1982 for
most of the major debtors, despite falling nominal interest rates, forcing
them to live without imports that could be invested in export industries
that would help service the debt.
Debt-to-exports and interest payments to exports*
Debt-to-Exports Interest-to-Exports
1982 1984 1985 1982 1984 1985
Argentina 405 473 483 50 56 52
Brazil 339 322 368 54 38 41
Chile 333 402 442 44 44 46
Ecuador 240 250 254 30 30 24
Mexico 299 293 322 44 37 33
Peru 251 330 370 25 33 31
Venezuela 169 177 201 18 16 18
Nigeria 85 165 180 8 11 13
Philippines 270 312 342 24 29 28
Yugoslavia 167 166 160 18 16 15
Average 257 279 308 34 31 31
Source: Morgan Guaranty, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, Sept/Oct. 1985, p.3. *Countries
listed comprise 10 major debtors. Debt-to-export ratio is calculated as the average of gross external
debt at the beginning and end of year as percent of exports of goods and services. Interest payments
to export ratio is scheduled interest payments as percent of exports of goods and services.
For low-income Africa, the World Bank estimates that the debt ra-
tio doubled from 1978 .to 1983, hitting 393%, nearly double the 200%
level previously considered creditworthy. 30 For SSA as a whole, the debt
ratio has increased from 200% in 1982 to 240% in 1985, an average that
29 INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, (April 1985).
30 WORLD BANK, EXTERNAL DEBT DIVISION, WORLD DEBT TABLES, 1985-86 (1987).
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conceals great variation.31 In 1985, debt ratios within SSA ranged from
over 1000% in Mozambique, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau to less than 50%
in Gabon, Botswana and Lesotho.32 According to the IMF, interest pay-
ments to exports increased from 9% of exports in 1982 to 14% in 1985,
but as for the debt ratio, the average conceals enormous variation from
less than 5% in seven countries to more than 68% in Mozambique and
Sudan.33 Thus, Hope and Larkum of the World Bank conclude that in
1985:
[E]ven for most of those problem debtor countries steadfastly pursuing
efforts to strengthen their economies, the restoration of creditworthi-
ness came no closer; for many others, it receded. Confidence in these
countries' economic prospects, an essential component of their return
to financial health, can no longer be expected to recover rapidly.
34
Furthermore, the short-term strategy is not likely to succeed in the
future given external trends that violate the six underlying assumptions
identified earlier, calling the strategy's premise, as well as its perform-
ance, into question. World output and trade are growing slowly despite
falling oil prices. Real interest rates remain high, while commodity
prices remain low, and external finance shows few signs of returning to
troubled debtors. Each point will be considered in turn.
First, growth has slowed more than expected in the industrial coun-
tries to 2.75% in 1985 and an estimated 2.8% in 1986 despite falling oil
prices. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) expects growth to reach about 3% in 1987. 35
Second, some developing countries are having difficulty maintaining
access to developed country markets and competing with subsidised
United States and European Community agricultural exports. The vol-
ume of world trade grew only 3.5% in 1985, less than half the 1984 rate
of 8.5% and by most forecasts is not expected to increase greatly in 1986
and 1987. This situation reduces debtors' opportunities to increase mar-
ket share.36
Third, the World Bank estimates that the dollar value of commodity
prices (excluding oil) fell 11% in 1985, after improving in 1983 and 1984,
leaving prices 26% below their 1980 level. This decline has sent the
Bank's non-oil commodity price index to its lowest point in its 27-year
31 INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, (April 1986).
32 Brau, supra note 22, at 39 (Table 218).
33 The seven include Cameroon, Guinea, Gabon, Botswana, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Djibouti.
34 Hope & Larkum, Development and Debt Service: Dilemma of the 1980s, WORKING PAPER
No. 1986-1, (World Bank, External Debt Division, January 1986).
35 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK (1986).
36 Consensus of projections done by June of 1986 including: INT'L MONETARY FUND WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, (April 1986); OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, (May 1986).
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history.37 With the possible exceptions of sugar, coffee, maize and cot-
ton, commodity prices are not expected to recover in the medium term.
Fourth, commercial banks have not increased their exposure to de-
veloping countries by the 6% to 7% per annum originally envisaged by
the debt management strategy, but have reduced their lending to Latin
America and Africa to $2.1 billion and $0.7 billion in 1985.38 As the
Table below shows, lending to all non-oil developing countries in 1985
recovered to about 1983 levels, but the bulk went to Asian countries
without debt problems.
New net flows from private banks, 1980-85 ($US billions)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Latin America 27.3 30.5 12.2 8.1 3.6 2.1
Africa 2.0 2.0 1.7 0.3 0.2 0.7
Asia, Middle East 9.7 7.4 5.9 3.5 5.0 8.5
Total* 39.0 39.9 29.8 11.9 8.8 11.3
Quarterly new net flows from private banks, 1985-1986.1 ($US billions)
1985.1 1985.I 1985.111 1985.IV 1986.1 1986.11 1986.111
Latin America 0.0 0.5 -0.3 1.9 -2.2 -0.1 -0.8
Africa 0.0 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.3
Asia, Middle East -0.7 2.6 3.2 3.4 -2.3 0.3 0.7
Total -0.7 3.4 2.8 5.8 -5.2 -0.1 0.2
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEVELOP-
MENTS, January 1987. *Total includes non-Opec developing countries.
The Baker Initiative, unveiled at the 1985 IMF/World Bank An-
nual Meeting in Seoul, has not restored bank lending to promised levels.
The plan called on commercial banks to increase their exposure by
slightly more than 2% per year and lend $20 billion in new money to the
heavily indebted, middle-income countries over the next three years; on
the multilateral institutions to increase their lending by about 50% above
recent levels and the World Bank to make more policy loans; and on the
IMF Trust Fund to aid low-income debtors. 39
As the Table shows, the commercial banks have withdrawn $1.1 bil-
lion from Latin America since the Baker Initiative was announced in the
37 Hope & Larkum, supra note 34.
38 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEVELOPMENTS
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS, (various issues).
39 The Baker Initiative would raise $40 billion over three years for 15 countries that owe about
$430 billion and which pay about $40 billion in interest per year. It excludes the Paris Club and
governments and only offers debtors one-third of their interest payments on average, implying debt-
ors must maintain permanent, large trade surpluses.
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third quarter of 1985 and contributed only $0.2 billion to Africa. The
decline in commercial lending to developing countries is linked to three
trends. First, the flow of surplus Japanese, West German, and other cap-
ital into the United States diverts savings that developing countries could
potentially borrow.' Second, lenders increasingly use securities markets
where different, and more restrictive, creditworthiness standards apply.41
Third, and most importantly, bankers as a group view developing coun-
tries as unsafe and simply are not willing to lend any more new money
than is strictly necessary to safeguard previous loans. Hope and Larkum
of the World Bank argue that:
After 1982, creditors became much more conservative in their view of
the economic possibilities of the developing countries, as real interest
rates increased, the terms of trade worsened and export prospects dete-
riorated. The debt indicators themselves worsened and creditors' read-
ing of them both moved adversely for developing countries... Against
this background, the recent weakness of private lending to the develop-
ing countries cannot be seen as an aberration, likely to correct itself in
the near term.42
Furthermore, the IMF is in danger of receiving more in repayments
on past loans than it dispenses as loans made in the early years of the
debt crises fall due.43 The net repayment will depend on future loans and
therefore cannot be estimated precisely. The World Bank has increased
its lending, particularly the fast-disbursing policy loans, but may also re-
ceive net repayments in 1986.'
The fifth trend to work against the debt management strategy is the
persistence of high real interest rates even though nominal interest rates
have fallen. The World Bank estimates that real interest rates adjusted
for developing countries' export prices were 10% for oil importers, down
from 12.7% in 1984, but still high by historical standards and measured
against returns to investment. For oil exporters, real interest rates in-
creased to 12.5% in 1985, from 1984's 12.1%. 45
Finally, debtors are growing increasingly less willing to accept fall-
ing levels of consumption, investment, and imports and to postpone the
40 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1986).
41 Id.
42 Hope & Larkum, supra note 34.
43 United Nations. Committee for Development Planning. Doubling Finance for Development:
Meeting a Global Challenge, April 1986. Report to July 1986 session of the Economic and Social
Council. See also, D. Lessard & J. Williamson, Financial Intermediation Beyond the Debt Crisis, 12
POLICY ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, (Sept. 12, 1985); I.M.F., WORLD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK Table A40 (1986); UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report Table 22 (1986).
44 Fleming, World Bank on brink of taking in more funds than go in aid, FINANCIAL TIMES,
June 23, 1986.
45 Hope & Larkum, supra note 34, at 21.
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recovery of living standards. As Mexico's former finance minister Silva-
Herzog told a conference in London in January 1986, "The limit of the
responsibility to our creditors is the responsibility to our people."
46
As Dell points out, it is the political willingness of debtors to accept
sacrifices that is the most sensitive link in the debt strategy.47 Debtors'
impatience seemed to shift to a higher plane in mid-1985 when Fidel
Castro urged Latin America's leaders not to pay the close to $400 billion
due and Peru's President Alan Garcia announced at his July 28 inaugu-
ration that the country would pay a maximum of 10% of exports annu-
ally to service its $14 billion debt.48
The Reagan Administration reassessed its debt strategy in mid-1985
and introduced the Baker Initiative in response to the poor external eco-
nomic trends and debtors' increasing impatience. The Baker Initiative
accepts for the first time a point long made by the debtors-that adjust-
ment would have to be accompanied by growth to succeed.
The debtors called the Baker Initiative a first step forward and wel-
comed its increased flexibility and growth emphasis, but argued that the
plan did not mobilize enough external finance to allow them to restore
growth and service their debts regularly.49 As we have seen, the plan has
not even delivered the levels of finance criticized at the outset by debtors
as too low.
The $12 billion Mexican rescue package agreed to by the IMF in
July could be another such step forward if the commercial banks dis-
bursed the promised $6 billion and extend the agreement to other debt-
ors. The package allows for automatic increases in lending if the oil price
falls below $9 per barrel or if Mexico's GDP growth does not recover to
3-4% by the end of the first quarter of 1987.10 The level of lending will
fall by a like amount if the oil price climbs above $14 per barrel.
46 Address by J. Silva-Herzog entitled The Evolution and Prospects of the Latin American
Debt Problem, delivered to a conference sponsored by the International Herald Tribune reprinted in
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, BEYOND THE DEBT CRISIS-THE LATIN AMERICA:
THE NEXT TEN YEARS, (January 1986).
47 Dell, supra note 14.
48 Interview with Fidel Castro, How and Why the Unpayable Foreign Debt of Latin America
and the Third World must be Cancelled and the Urgent Need for a New International Economic
Order, GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW,; Reid, Garcia taking a firm line on Peru's $14 billion debt bur-
den, GUARDIAN, August 13, 1985; Martin, Castro presses his case for repudiation of foreign debts,
GUARDIAN, July 30, 1985; Rumblings in Latin America, FINANCIAL TIMES, August 6, 1986.
49 See, Navarrete, Foreign Policy and International Financial Negotiations: The External Debt
and the Cartagena Consensus, 27CEPAL REVIEW, (Dec. 1985); Tussie, The Coordination of the Latin
American Debtors, in DEBT CRISES OF THE EIGHTIES AND THEIR IMPACT, (S. Griffith-Jones ed.
forthcoming 1987).
50 Mexican Government, Mexico's Economic Program of Growth-Oriented Adjustment and
Structural Reform: 1986-1987; see also Mexican Gov't Commercial Bank Financing Package for
Mexico, (October 1986).
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The Mexican package, with its explicit commitment to financing for
growth, marks the first time the IMF has agreed to a non-deflationary
adjustment plan and follows in the spirit of the Baker Initiative. If the
banks agree to it, they are sure to stress that Mexico's status as an oil
exporter makes it a special case. If other debtors can negotiate similar
deals, the Mexican blueprint could prove a flexible-enough management
strategy to relieve some debtors' financing problems.
Thus, the debt management to date has not made great progress
towards a long-run solution to developing countries' financing problems
as measured against its own creditworthiness yardsticks. Nor is it likely
to work given the probable persistence of unfavorable external trends.
The Baker Initiative and Mexican package, with their emphasis on
growth and flexibility, are steps in the right direction.
Indeed, the excessive reliance on short-run, current account correc-
tion at all costs may have prevented movement towards a long-term solu-
tion by squeezing out investment needed in export and import-
substituting sectors to generate the foreign exchange which could be used
to service the debt. But the strategy has worked to the advantage of
commercial banks, agencies and creditor governments by allocating most
of the costs of adjusting to these trends to debtors.
From the bankers' viewpoint, the strategy has prevented a major
crash and write-offs, and safeguarded the precedent of repayment for fu-
ture use. Banks' depositors have not been asked to absorb the costs of
their imprudent lending. The 24 largest United States banks have re-
duced their exposure to developing country debtors from 200% of capital
in 1982 to 148% in 1985.51
From an institutional point of view, the debt crises have strength-
ened the hand of the IMF, which had taken a back seat to the large
private financial flows of the 1970s, and may well increase the influence
of the World Bank and the other multilateral banks.
The Reagan administration, likewise, has avoided a financial crash.
The cost of direct intervention has largely preserved precedents, and has
suffered no great foreign policy defeats on the debt front. As a bonus,
debt management has allowed the administration to export its free-mar-
ket philosophies such as liberalization of trade, foreign investment rules
and privatization of public companies as part of IMF packages.
The debtors, on the other hand, have contended with diminishing
and negative financial flows, negative per capita growth rates, increasing
political instability and severe reductions in the saving and investment
needed to fuel growth and development. That they have continued to
service their debt more or less faithfully without the restoration of
51 Hope & Larkum, supra note 34, at 22 (citing United States Federal Financial Institute Ex-
amination Council).
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creditworthiness and financial flows on which the debt strategy was pre-
mised is remarkable (it is not surprising that the debtors are now de-
manding-individually and collectively-a better deal).
IV. A NEW MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
The net negative transfers and the uncertainty of long-run adjust-
ment without adequate investment have compelled debtors to seek a bet-
ter deal from the international financial system by cashing in on their
improved bargaining hand.
As we have seen, debtors are just beginning to capitalize on their
bargaining strengths as their perceptions of their options and their will-
ingness to resort to unilateral action change with the calculus of the costs
and benefits of not servicing their debts as agreed. In the past, analysts
have seen debtors' options in black-and-white terms-default or cooper-
ate with a market solution. Increasingly debtors are moving into a grey
area of conciliatory default or flexible market solutions where debt serv-
icing obligations in the long-run are adhered to, but short-run costs are
reallocated.
In this section, the approach will be first to review the new elements
of the management strategy that has evolved since 1982 and argue that it
has favored the creditors, and second, to show how debtors' assessment
of the costs and benefits of their options are changing. The magnitude of
the debt crises that emerged after 1982 overwhelmed traditional methods
of resolving sovereign debtors' financing problems and led to six innova-
tions, each of which affects debtors' bargaining strengths.
First, financial interests, institutions, and criteria have dominated
debt management to the disadvantage of debtors and non-financial inter-
ests in the developed countries like exporters. UNCTAD estimates that
falling OECD exports to developing countries have cost a cumulative
loss of close to seven million man-years of employment in Europe and
close to one million in the United States and Canada from 1982 through
1984.52
Both the Reagan Administration and Congress worried about the
growing United States trade deficit, have realized in recent months that
United States manufacturers and exporters suffer when Latin American
debtors are forced to run huge trade surpluses to service their debts.
This perception may have contributed to the new flexible market ap-
proach to debt management.53
This financial slant has also reinforced the short-term nature of rem-
edies, particularly the one-year rescheduling packages. Under this
52 Dell, supra note 14, at 45.
53 Joint Economic Committee supra note 9.
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"short-leash" approach, debtors and creditors negotiated nearly conti-
nously, creating innumerable opportunities for brinkmanship and height-
ening uncertainty. Several debtors have recently won multi-year
rescheduling agreements. This change is bound to benefit all parties. 4
Finally, financial interests required financial measures of progress.
Thus, debt-to-export ratios and new flows have predominated rather
than unemployment, real wages and growth- which are measures of the
real economy-and are couching the debate in terms unfavorable to
debtors.
Second, the international agencies have returned to center stage to
orchestrate rescue packages that include restructuring of maturing debt
and new bank finance in exchange for tight policy conditions. The IMF
stepped into the breach early on. Thus the World Bank may play a more
important role in the new more flexible packages.
Third, commercial banks have lent "involuntarily" under IMF pres-
sure preventing an even greater fall in net new lending than the markets
would have provided after 1982.11
Fourth, the banks have set up steering committees to negotiate with
debtors on behalf of hundreds of banks ensuring a united bargaining
front that greatly strengthened the bankers' bargaining hand.
Fifth, debtors have bargained on a case-by-case basis with creditors
in contrast to the creditors' relative unity. The early vision of the debt
crises as a short-run problem accepted each case as different, preempting
a search for more global solutions like a debtors' cartel, and forcing debt-
ors to negotiate singlehandedly with the banks as a group.
Sixth, debtors and creditors have opted for multilaterally agreed ac-
tion negotiated between the commercial banks, international agencies
and debtor governments. In the 1930s, negotiation followed unilateral
action, often resulting default. However, since 1982, negotiation has pre-
ceded action.
The debt management strategy that evolved after 1982 led most
debtors to weigh the costs of default more heavily than the benefits based
on four prevalent ideas: creditors could recover their losses; well-be-
haved debtors would get new loans; default would irreparably tarnish a
debtors' creditworthiness and postpone the restoration of external lend-
ing; and for Brazil and Mexico, default would bring down the interna-
tional financial system. We will consider each argument in turn.
Anatole Kaletsky argues that the costs of default are much lower
than generally supposed.56 The laws safeguarding sovereign nations'
54 The durability of the agreements is questionable, as Mexico has already been forced to rene-
gotiate its agreement just months into its three-year term.
55 Without I.M.F. packages, the banks would have lent nothing.
56 A. KALETSKY, THE COST OF DEFAULT (1985).
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rights ensure that private creditors have few means of recovering their
assets after a default. Creditor governments have more options but have
shown little inclination to use them in the cases of Peru and Nigeria and
will give first priority to shoring up their domestic banking systems.
Kaletsky argues that debtors can minimize the remaining costs of
default by taking a conciliatory approach i.e. servicing debts owed to
suppliers and multilateral banks and not those to lenders who will not
loan more in the short term in any case.57 Debtors, well-behaved and
otherwise, have been repaying banks more than they have been lent, es-
pecially in Latin America, eroding the perceived benefits of servicing
debt. Banks are reluctant to lend to most debtors, creditworthy or not.
Finally, debtors have realized that the banks are stronger than they
were in 1982 and default would not, in Kaletsky's words, "result in
worldwide economic armageddon. ' 58 Wall Street estimates that a total
loss of interest payments from Mexico would reduce the earnings of the
leading U.S. banks, which hold about a third of the total debt, by about
20 percent. Major banks in other countries would be affected less.59 A
20% loss would badly hurt fragile banks, but could probably be con-
tained. The real question is who pays: stockholders, taxpayers or depos-
itors? Thus, in 1986, debtors perceive the costs of default and the
benefits of faithful debt servicing to be lower than in 1982. They are
increasingly willing to take unilateral action as the traditional debt strat-
egy fails to work and austerity increases political instability.
Several countries have applied this newly perceived bargaining ad-
vantage. Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Costa Rica and Bolivia have taken
some sort of unilateral action.60 Mexico has negotiated a new, more flex-
57 Id.
58 Kaletsky, Crying Wolf in Mexico, FINANCIAL TIMEs, July 1, 1986 (Lombard column).
59 War on Want's Working Party on Debt calculates that Latin American income represents
about 5.5% of the annual interest income of the British banks and that even a total cessation of
payments of interest and profit would still leave the banks in net profit before tax except Midland's
which would lose 140 million pounds.
60 Costa Rica quietly stopped servicing its debt in the autumn of 1986 when its creditors re-
fused to reschedule $1.4 billion in external debt over 25 years at below-market rates. Costa Rica
argued that it should never pay more than 1.5% of its GDP in debt-service and that interest charges
should be fixed at 4% until 1988, rising in stages to 6% in 1993. P. Montagnon, Costa Rica asks for
'cut-prices' rescheduling, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1986; Bolivia halted interest payments to credi-
tor banks in 1984 and in late 1986 owed over $200 million in arrears. In 1986, the Bolivian govern-
ment entered negotiations with the Paris Club to reschedule about half of its external debt, after a
dramatic domestic adjustment program, but announced in January 1987 that it would ask creditor
governments to cancel all or part of their loans to Bolivia. FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 1987. Peru's
President Alan Garcia announced in his inauguration speech in July 1985 that debt-service pay-
ments would be limited to 10% of exports, the first major public debt-service cap by a debtor, but an
improvement on what the country had been paying. The cap was later extended to private sector
debt and the profits and royalties of foreign companies. The I.M.F. declared Peru ineligible for new
loans in August 1986. The country continues to receive trade credits, largely from European banks,
Vol. 19:53
DEBT MANAGEMENT
ible deal with its bankers that will serve its interests. 'Brazil has steered
clear of the IMF and still agreed on a rescheduled agreement with the
Paris Club.61
The majority of debtors, especially those in SSA, will continue to
adjust their economies and service their debt within the multilateral
and the World Bank and IDB have disbursed previously agreed loans. No new loans are likely from
either multilateral agencies, governments or banks. Peru sought negotiations with its commercial
bankers in September 1986 on rescheduling of $6 billion of its $14 billion debt, but an agreement is
unlikely without an I.M.F. package, which President Garcia continues to resist. Peru grew an esti-
mated 8.5% in 1986, more than any other country in Latin America except Brazil, and is expected
to grow about 6% in 1987. ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1985, Sept. 21, 1985, Mar. 29, 1986, Aug. 23, 1986,
Jan. 10, 1987; Peru puts its Creditors' Patience to the Test FINANCIAL TIMES, July 30, 1986; Peru
President Defies IMF. Credit Freeze, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 30, 1986, Peru prepares to go it alone,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1986; Garcia Stays on Path to Growth, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 13,
1987. African countries have also taken unilateral action, often quietly letting arrears pile up, but
occasionally by publicly limiting debt-servicing. The Sudan, like Peru, was declared ineligible for
futher I.M.F. loans in February 1986 because of long-standing interest arrears on its I.M.F. loans.
The country owes an estimated $13 billion to multilateral agencies, banks and governments. Sudan
still suffers the after-effects of famine and from civil war. IMF. Talks with Sudan Fail, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1985, Sudanese Officials Begin IMF. Loan Talks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 1985,
Sudan and IMF. in Deal on Policy Reforms, FINANCIAL TIMES Nov. 14, 1985, IMF Bans New
Loans to Sudan, FINANCIAL TIMES Feb. 5, 1986, Sudan Performs an Uncertain Balancing Act, FI-
NANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 1987. The Nigerian government announced in January 1986 that it would
pay no more than 30% of export earnings to service its $7 billion debt in 1986. In March, the
government asked its creditors for a 90-day moratorium on principal repayments on medium and
long-term debt, after oil prices collapsed. The government continues to limit debt-servicing to 30%
of exports, but has negotiated rescheduling agreements with bank and government creditors on
much of its $22 billion debt. The government has agreed to policies supported by the I.M.F., includ-
ing a controversial exchange rate auction, but refuses to take an unpopular I.M.F. loan. Nigerians
Reluctant to Take LMF. s Bitter Remedy, FINANCIAL TIMES Sept. 20, 1985, Nigeria Likely to Begin
$7bn Rescheduling Talks Soon, FINANCIAL TIMES Feb. 24, 1986. Nigeria announces Cautious
Budget to Boost Recovery, FINANCIAL TIMES Jan. 2, 1987; Nigeria Misses $30m Interest Payment on
Ininsured Trade Debts, FINANCIAL TIMES Jan. 20, 1987; ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1986. South Africa
stopped repaying the principal on $10 billion of its $22 billion foreign debt in September 1985 after
U.S. banks decided not to rollover the loans because of increasing political pressure at home. Under
a February 1986 agreement, the banks agreed to extend the maturities of the $10 billion in short-
term debt to June 1987. South Africa in turn agreed to pay interest on all outstanding loans, to
make a $500 million principal repayment on the $10 billion, and to pay $1.6 billion in principal
repayment on loans that fell outside the moratorium. The agreement has held to date, but South
Africa warns it could break down if sanctions are imposed. The deal will be renegotiated in June
1987. S. Africa Freezes Loan Repayments for Four Months, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 2, 1976, South
African Bank Deadlock, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1986, Luetwiler Quits as South African Debt
Mediator, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 4, 1986, South Africa's Economy: Twenty Six Years of Seige,
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 11, 1986. DeKoch, Investor Doubts Hit South Africa, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1986. Pretoria Freeze on Debt Repayment Likely to be Extended, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept.
7, 1985, Leutwiler to be Absent from S. Africa Debt Talks, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 8, 1986.
61 Careiro, Brazil and the IMF.: Logic and Story of Stalemate, in THE DEBT CRISIS OF THE
EIGHTIES AND THEIR IMPACT, (S. Griffith-Jones ed. forthcoming 1987): Bankers'Latin Headaches
are Throbbing Again, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1987.
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framework for want of individual bargaining power and/or the economic
strength to forego IMF rescues.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS
The debt management strategy that evolved after 1982 appears in-
creasingly unsatisfactory after the poor 1985 and 1986 performance of
commodity prices, bank lending, world growth and the shift in bargain-
ing power from creditors to debtors. Latin American debtors, with large
debts and negative net transfers, seem to have a substantial unexploited
bargaining potential and should increasingly use it to re-define the mini-
mum deal acceptable to them while bargaining for reschedulings and new
capital flows. That is, debtor countries should force the international
financial system to adjust to their development needs by relaxing con-
straints imposed by inadequate capital transfers.
Clearly such a minimum deal would not be defined in the abstract,
but would be made consistent with acceptable minimum levels of growth
for the debtors as well as acceptable levels of income, employment and
social expenditure for the poor. Mexico's $12 billion package, with its
provision for more loans if growth does not recover, could be a blueprint
for other debtor negotiations if the commercial banks follow through.
The deal does not require the banks to take losses and adds further to
Mexico's debt burden. Therefore this deal may not be the final solution,
but it is finally a deal that serves some of the debtors' interests.
The debtor governments could also use their unexploited bargaining
strength if they either individually or collectively suspended net transfers
for a finite period, or limited debt servicing, as Peru has done, while com-
mitting themselves to service their debt in the long term. The suspension
of negative net transfers is justified by the need to restore growth and to
strengthen debtors' ability to service their debts in the long run, as long
as appropriate adjustment and development strategies are followed as
well.
Such a conciliatory cessation of negative net transfers would imply
that governments would continue to service the debt in amounts equal to
new credit or liquidity, creating a strong incentive for creditor govern-
ments and/or international financial institutions to expand direct lending
or their guarantees This is to increase international liquidity through, for
example, a new issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), or to permit
some form of interest capping or debt relief to ease the burden of debt-
servicing.
A policy package designed to overcome the crises of debt and
growth should strive for the following four features. First, and most fun-
damentally, the measures need to reduce or preferably eliminate negative
net transfers in Latin America and increase positive net transfers to low-
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income countries. Thus, debtors should not confine bargaining either to
multi-year rescheduling, or reduction of fees and spreads, used in debt
renegotiations in 1984 and most of 1985, because such changes are mar-
ginal in relation to the size of the problem.
Second, any resources freed by a policy package should be used to
sustain growth and increase the population's welfare, especially the
poor's. Wealthy citizens should contribute through direct taxes or repa-
triation of thier money abroad, especially if that package entails debt re-
lief or interest concessions.
Third, the package should not excessively favor large debtors, who
enjoy relatively stronger bargaining positions by virtue of their large neg-
ative transfers and the potential cost to the international system by a
default. Debt crises in low-income countries, especially in SSA, began
earlier, are even more damaging to their economies and cause even
greater hardship than those in Latin America.
Across-the-board, bank-debt-relief or interest concessions would
tend to favor more heavily indebted countries and be biased against
countries that could not or did not borrow heavily from the commercial
banks. Thus, debt relief or interest concessions should probably be com-
bined with some foregiveness of low-income countries' official debt. A
new management strategy, like Mexico's, could benefit all developing
countries if major debtors get better deals; the precedent could increase
the bargaining strength and confidence of less powerful and smaller
countries.
Fourth, packages should contribute to global economic growth in
the short and medium-term, by reducing foreign exchange constraints on
debtors and by introducing counter-cyclical lending and greater stability
into the global economy as a whole.
The complexity of the debt problem, the diversity of the debtors,
especially in SSA and the size of debtors' external financing gap, seem to
require a package of measures rather than a single policy. Governments
and official institutions will probably have to play a larger role in interna-
tional financial intermediation to sustain or increase financial flows to
developing countries. Thus, a policy package should probably include an
expansion of new official flows through multilateral or bilateral agencies,
or an expansion of government guarantees, insurance or lender of last
resort facilities that would combine public purpose and private finance or
both. Schemes that mainly comfort the commercial bankers, such as co-
financing with the World Bank and to some extent, the Baker Initiative,
may fail to generate sufficient private flows.
Interest relief also seems important as long as the value of debtors'
exports grows slowly or falls and interest rates remain high, to avoid the
value of the debt growing too much in absolute terms and in relation to
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L Lo
exports. Concessionary interest capping, then, may help debtors and
prove not too onerous for creditors.
Even though the banks have written down a portion of their devel-
oping country debt, they have not as yet granted either debt relief or even
more importantly, interest relief. The banks could use their reserves to
relieve the debtors' burden.
Finally, a package should promote counter-cyclical lending through,
for example, a compensatory financing facility for interest rates or a new
issue of SDRs at the IMF. Such an increase in liquidity not tied to
creditworthiness, would make the world more stable by reducing the
damage of the current debt crises and the likelihood of future ones.
The above proposals are not particularly radical and have been in-
corporated in part in Mexico's new package.62 They would stand a much
greater chance of restoring growth and debt-servicing capability if indus-
trial countries reduced the financial and trade imbalances slowing world
growth. Developing countries will have to "solve" their financing
problems in large measure by continuing to adjust, freeing domestic re-
sources and insisting on more flexible rescheduling packages that serve
their development needs. The traditional debt management strategy fo-
cused on debtors' power to disrupt the international banking system. We
believe a new debt management strategy should insist that debtor devel-
oping countries use their power to make the international financial sys-
tem stronger, more stable and more likely to support their development
needs.
62 Mexico's Economic Program, supra note 50.
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